Prophecy,
I'm pretty certain from what you've said, and the equivalences you want to draw between people and other animals, that you hold that the pain other animals experience provides them equal moral footing with human beings. One problem (there are others) in granting the same basic rights (life, liberty, pursuit of happiness) to all creatures capable of feeling pain--let's call this Peter Singer's position--is that it leads to unsupportable and often perverse conclusions. For instance, if we accept that human beings and squirrels both experience pain, consider the following scenario.
You're driving your car on a road near a school. Walking down the sidewalk, you see a human child. Suddenly, a squirrel runs out in front of your car, and to avoid it, you must run your vehicle up on the sidewalk, striking the child.
If we hold these two beings as moral equals, either choice--squirrel or human child--is acceptable. If not, if we have strong intuitions that the child's life is more important than the squirrel's, and if we hold that killing the child to save the squirrel would be morally unacceptable, it exposes a flaw in Peter Singer's position.
A similar point was made by Richard Posner in response to Singer. I take this quote from their correspondence, which you can find at:
https://www.utilitarian.net/singer/interviews-debates/200106--.htm
"Suppose a dog menaced a human infant and the only way to prevent the dog from biting the infant was to inflict severe pain on the dog—more pain, in fact, than the bite would inflict on the infant. You [Singer] would have to say, let the dog bite (for "if an animal feels pain, the pain matters as much as it does when a human feels pain," provided the pain is as great). But any normal person (and not merely the infant's parents!), including a philosopher when he is not self-consciously engaged in philosophizing, would say that it would be monstrous to spare the dog, even though to do so would minimize the sum of pain in the world."
Now, if you accept that you should respect the pain caused to other animals, including squirrels, but that human life is ultimately more valuable, you'd need to say why you hold this view. The end result will be lowering the standard of concern for the suffering of non-human animals. if you hold them as fundamental equals, then the lives of squirrels and chimpanzees and dogs should be of just as much concern for us morally, and we should be (as Singer is) willing to kill x number of humans if it saves/improves the lives of x+1 other animals.
I'm pretty certain from what you've said, and the equivalences you want to draw between people and other animals, that you hold that the pain other animals experience provides them equal moral footing with human beings. One problem (there are others) in granting the same basic rights (life, liberty, pursuit of happiness) to all creatures capable of feeling pain--let's call this Peter Singer's position--is that it leads to unsupportable and often perverse conclusions. For instance, if we accept that human beings and squirrels both experience pain, consider the following scenario.
You're driving your car on a road near a school. Walking down the sidewalk, you see a human child. Suddenly, a squirrel runs out in front of your car, and to avoid it, you must run your vehicle up on the sidewalk, striking the child.
If we hold these two beings as moral equals, either choice--squirrel or human child--is acceptable. If not, if we have strong intuitions that the child's life is more important than the squirrel's, and if we hold that killing the child to save the squirrel would be morally unacceptable, it exposes a flaw in Peter Singer's position.
A similar point was made by Richard Posner in response to Singer. I take this quote from their correspondence, which you can find at:
https://www.utilitarian.net/singer/interviews-debates/200106--.htm
"Suppose a dog menaced a human infant and the only way to prevent the dog from biting the infant was to inflict severe pain on the dog—more pain, in fact, than the bite would inflict on the infant. You [Singer] would have to say, let the dog bite (for "if an animal feels pain, the pain matters as much as it does when a human feels pain," provided the pain is as great). But any normal person (and not merely the infant's parents!), including a philosopher when he is not self-consciously engaged in philosophizing, would say that it would be monstrous to spare the dog, even though to do so would minimize the sum of pain in the world."
Now, if you accept that you should respect the pain caused to other animals, including squirrels, but that human life is ultimately more valuable, you'd need to say why you hold this view. The end result will be lowering the standard of concern for the suffering of non-human animals. if you hold them as fundamental equals, then the lives of squirrels and chimpanzees and dogs should be of just as much concern for us morally, and we should be (as Singer is) willing to kill x number of humans if it saves/improves the lives of x+1 other animals.